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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of THERESA HOLLAND,
Petitioner,
-againstANDREA EVANS, CHAIRMAN
OF BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI ## 01-10-ST2045 Index No. 7323-10
Appearances :

Theresa Holland
Inmate No. 86-G-02 15
Petitioner, Pro Se
Albion Correctional Facility
3595 State School Road
Albion, NY 144 1 1
Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Justin C. Levin,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate at Albion Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant

to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving two indeterminate
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concurrent terms of 25 years to life upon conviction after trial of murder in the second degree
and kidnaping in the first degree. The petitioner contends that the decision of the Parole
Board to deny release and to order her held for twenty four months was excessive and
“insufficiently rational to be allowed to stand“. She maintains that the Parole Board failed
to follow the requirements of Executive Law 8 259-i (2) (e). In her view, the Parole Board
did not give sufficient weight to her institutional programing, disciplinary record and her
plans upon being released. The latter includes taking up residence with Providence House
in Brooklyn, New York. She points out that she has had a clean disciplinary record for the
past four months. She criticizes the Parole Board for failing to consider her sentencing
minutes. In addition, she maintains that the Parole decision failed to address the proper
statutory factors.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:
“This panel has concluded that your release to supervision is not
compatible with the welfare of society and therefore, parole is
denied. This finding is made following a personal interview,
record review and deliberation. Of significant concern is the
bimrre and violent nntiirc of your instant offensi. of murder
second and kidnaping first. This involved the in-concert
kidnaping of a man for ransom. The victim was bound, gagged,
beaten and had a pipe inserted in his rectum. This occurred over
several days during which he died.
“Positive factors considered include program accomplishments
and document submissions. Your receipt of three disciplinary
violations is also noted. In addition, your comments during the
interview show little insight as to why you participated in this
crime. To grant your release at this time would so deprecate the
seriousness as to undermine respect for the law. The probability
j ULI n i l 1 li; s ZJXI
rLii;aiil dt IibLiIj + t i h u l \ ioldi;ib ‘Ilic 1d~ck,
not found to be reasonable, given the factors noted above.”
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As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A):

“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considewd: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A]).

Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matterpf Tollado v New Ynrk Stnt? Division of Parole, 287 AD3d 931 [3d Dapt.,
20011). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,
the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
--s i q a ) .

Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part

of the Parole Board has been found to necessitatejudicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [200r)]. quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of
-P , r t . ~ ~ l50
c , Y7Til

77 [l‘’sO]).
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to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner's institutional programming, vocational training, her disciplinary record,
and her plans upon release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner
of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law
$2594 (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201
AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199
AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board
consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir
v New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of
Sinopoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v
Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or
give equal weight to each factor that it considwed in determining the inmate's application,
or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Young- v New York Division of Parole, 74
AD3d 1681, 1681-1682 [3rdDept., 20101; Matter of Wise v New York State Division of
Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory
language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law

3 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of

Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rdDept.. 20061). In other words, "[wlhere appropriate
thc D o a J

iiiaj' g i b L

wiididuidblL

L ~ ,ui

L:akii

4

p l d ~y u~l L i d d i

I~ I I ~ ) ~ J - I > 0
;1
>1,

111~.

[* 5]

circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated. as well as a petitioner’s
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the
individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her
‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate
the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Mattel.of Durio v New
York State Division ofparole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law 5259-i
[2] [c] [A], other citations omitted).
With respect to petitioner’s argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seekjudicial
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR

9 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York

State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rdDept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex
rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rdDept., 20001; Matter of Mentor v New York State
Division of Parole, 67AD3d 1 108, 1 109 [3rdDept.. 20091).
With regard to the Parole Board’s failure to consider the minutes of petitioner’s
sentencing, it is now well settled that this does not mandate a new hearing if, as here, the
minutes were not available for review (see Matter of Freeman v Alexander, 65 AD3d 1429,

[3rdDept., 20091; Matter of Blasich v New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1339,
1340-1341 [3rdDept., 20091; see also Matter of Lebron v Alexander, 68 AD3d 1476, 1477
[3rdDept., 20091 [Held: where the Parole Board is unable to consider the sentencing minutes
3
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Dept., 20 lo]).

In this instance, the Facility Parole Officer of Albion Correctional Facility made two
requeqts to the sentencing court for the sentencing minutes. He did not receive a response.
Counsel for the Division of Parole made two more requests for the sentencing minutes. On
Dccembcr 9, 20 10 Counsel for the Division of Parole received an affidavit from Principal
Court Reporter Frank Rizzo confirming that a diligent effort had been made to locate the
sentencing minutes but that they could not be located; and that the court reporter who had
taken the stenographic notes of the sentencing was no longer employed by the court system.
The Court finds that the respondent made a diligent search for the sentencing minutes, and
is unable to consider them for reasons beyond the Parole Board's control. For this reason
petitioner's argument has no merit.

In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (seeMatter of Tatta
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98
NY2d 604).
The Cciirt ha< reviewed petitinner's remairlin,n ~ r-c l i i m e n t s2nd mntentivw 3 r d find<
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
piitiiwi
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is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the responderits. All otlzcr papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/-judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

I

ENTER

1.
2.

Order To Show Cause dated November 4,20 10, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated January 3,201 1, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits

7

[* 8]

STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of THERESA HOLLAND,
Petitioner,
-a2ainstANDREA EVANS, CHAIRMAN
OF BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
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SEALING ORDER
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in
camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent’s Exhibit B,

Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent’s Exhibit E, Confidential Portion of Inmate
Status Report, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documcnts, including all duplicates and
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court.

ENTER
Dated:

March /
, 201 1
Troy, New York
George B. Ceresia, Jr.
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